Audit Quality and Company Size on Tax Avoidance: The Role of Independent Commissioners
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.37859/jae.v16i1.11390
Abstract
This study examines the effect of audit quality and firm size on tax avoidance, with independent commissioners as a moderating variable. Using 595 firm-year observations from 94 manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during 2016–2023, this study applies pooled panel regression with year fixed effects and firm-level clustered robust standard errors. The results show that audit quality is negatively associated with the effective tax rate, indicating higher tax avoidance. Firm size has no significant direct effect. Independent commissioners significantly strengthen the monitoring role of audit quality, but do not convert firm size into stronger tax compliance. These findings suggest that governance mechanisms influence tax avoidance differently depending on whether they operate through external audit quality or firm complexity.
Downloads
References
Armstrong, C. S., Blouin, J. L., Jagolinzer, A. D., & Larcker, D. F. (2015). Corporate governance, incentives, and tax avoidance. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 60(1), 1–17.
Hanlon, M., & Heitzman, S. (2010). A review of tax research. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 50(2)
Hidayat, K., & Zuhroh, D. (2023). The impact of environmental, social and governance, sustainable financial performance, ownership structure, and composition of company directors on tax avoidance: Evidence from Indonesia. International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, 13(6), 311–320.
Hossain, M. S., Ali, M. S., Islam, M. Z., Ling, C. C., & Fung, C. Y. (2024). Nexus between profitability, firm size and leverage and tax avoidance: Evidence from an emerging economy. Asian Review of Accounting, 32(5), 759–780.
Hossain, M. S., Ali, M. S., Ling, C. C., & Fung, C. Y. (2024). Tax avoidance and tax evasion: Current insights and future research directions from an emerging economy. Asian Journal of Accounting Research, 9(3), 275–292.
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360.
Kerr, J. N., Price, R., Román, F. J., & Romney, M. A. (2024). Corporate governance and tax avoidance: Evidence from governance reform. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 47, 107232.
Kovermann, J., & Velte, P. (2019). The impact of corporate governance on corporate tax avoidance—A literature review. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 36, 100270.
Qawqzeh, H. K. (2023). The effect of ownership structure on tax avoidance with audit quality as a moderating variable: Evidence from the ailing economics. Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting.
Republik Indonesia. (2021). Undang-Undang Nomor 7 Tahun 2021 tentang Harmonisasi Peraturan Perpajakan.
Rizqia, A., & Lastiati, A. (2021). Audit quality and tax avoidance: The role of independent commissioners and audit committee’s financial expertise. Journal of Accounting Auditing and Business, 4(1)
Sanoran, K. (2025). Corporate tax avoidance during the COVID-19 pandemic and the moderating role of audit firm tenure: Evidence from Thailand. Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting.
Shafiq, U. S., Selamat, A. I., Nor, N. M., & Noordin, B. A. A. (2024). How audit quality affects tax avoidance: An analytical study in Pakistan. International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, 14(9), 656–671.
Tobing, M. G. L., Sibarani, P., & Ratna. (2022). Pengaruh ukuran perusahaan, leverage, dan pertumbuhan penjualan terhadap penghindaran pajak: Studi kasus pada perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia. Jurnal Akuntansi, Keuangan dan Perpajakan, 5(2), 78–86.
Widiasmara, A. (2018). Pengaruh firm size terhadap aggressive tax avoidance: Corporate governance sebagai variabel moderating pada perusahaan manufaktur BEI tahun 2012–2015. Warta Dharmawangsa.
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2026 Jurnal Akuntansi dan Ekonomika

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.






